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NOTES AND COMMENT
It would seem that a statute rendering nugatory a contract of em-
ployment between a corporation and a stranger for a fixed and definite
term is harsh and not consonant with business practices. Law is un-
ceasingly harmonizing itself with customs and rules extant in the marts
of trade and adopting them as its own after they have been firmly
established. Under present conditions, the person who offers his per-
sonal services to a corporation is penalized and placed at a disadvan-
tage suffered by no other one dealing with a corporate 'body All others
who enter into a contract with a board of trustees receive a valid
instrument even though it extends over a period of time.
The interests of the stockholders should weigh no more heavily in
connection with the employee to his prejudice than with the countless
others dealing with the corporation. The evils of allowing the trustees
to contract for supplies, equipment and kindred commodities have never
been so great that they have been placed under the attention of the
legislators of this state. The privilege, allowed in other jurisdictions
but denied in this, has not been disastrous to the well-being of for-
eign corporations. Neither has it been irksome to the stockholders nor
the cause of diminishing profits.
W Harold Hutchinson.
THE EVIDENTIAL FORCE OF HABIT AND REPUTE AS OPPOSED TO
THE SUBSTANTIVE LAW CONCERNING MARRIAGE-The Washington
decisions have settled beyond a doubt that a valid marriage can not
take place in this state in any manner other than that prescribed by
statute. The statutes were originally enacted in 1854 and have come
down to us with practically no alterations and with but few additions.'
As early as 1892 it was decided that the statutory requirements were
mandatory, that a ceremony was essential and that common law mar-
riages, in this state, were invalid. Thus the substantive law has
become fixed.
2
The necessary consequence of the recognition by the common law
of the validity of marriage by private consent, was that such a mar-
riage could be proven by co-habitation and reputation, such co-habita-
tion and reputation being required as the equivalent of a contract in
present words between the parties and as effective to render them hus-
band and wife.3 It was not the public acknowledgment of each other
as husband and wife, nor the assumption of the marital rights and
duties, nor the general reputation of the parties as husband and wife
that constituted a marriage. The substantive common law required
a present agreement between the parties to take each other as husband
and wife. Yet, because of the private nature of the marriage, there
was rarely an eye witness to prove such consent. To foster whole-
some living, the law therefore adopted a rule of evidence allowing
Rem. Comp. Stat, §§ 8437-8454, me.
In re McLaughlin's Estate, 4 Wash. 570, 30 Pac. 651, 16 L. R. A. 699
(1892).
'Travers v. Reinhardt, -05 U. S. 423, 51 L. Ed. 865, 27 Sup. Ct. Rep. 563;
Eaton v. Eaton, 66 Nebr. 676, 92 N. W 995, 1 Ann. Cas. 199 (1902).
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the defect of proof of consent to be supplied by proof of co-habitation
and reputation.
The following review of our cases is designed to ascertain the extent
to which this rule has survived the abrogation of the common law in
this regard.
In In re McLaughlin s Estate,4 it appeared that McLaughlin died
intestate, leaving an alleged wife to whom he had been properly mar-
ried, so far as the ceremony was concerned, but who was incapacitated
at the time of such marriage by reason of having a former husband
whom she believed to be dead. When she learned otherwise she left
McLaughlin, secured a divorce from her first husband and then re-
sumed living with McLaughlin without the formality of another cere-
mony Thereafter, and until his death, they held themselves out to
the public as husband and wife and believed themselves to be such.
The trial court found that she was the widow of the deceased and
granted her letters of administration as against the petition of the de-
cedent's daughter. It was urged on appeal that there could be no com-
mon law marriage in this state, and that the proof was insufficient to
establish the marital relation even though the parties could have become
husband and wife by mere agreement between themselves. Scott, J.,
rendered the opinion of the Court and in the course thereof, page 585,
said "In all cases, whether common law marriages are recognized or
not, evidence of co-habitation and repute is admissible as tending to
show a valid marriage, holding each other out as husband and wife
to the public and continued living together in that relationship, has
ordinarily, but not universally, been held sufficient proof, unless con-
tradicted, to establish it even within those states where common law
marriages are not recognized." Yet the evidence of co-habitation and
repute, in this case, though uncontradicted, was not regarded as suffi-
cient to raise a presumption of marriage and the holding of the trial
court was, therefore, reversed. A similar decision was reached in In re
Smith s Estate.'
The question arose again in Stans v. Baitey.0  In that case the
decision that the parties were not husband and wife was probably
justified on the ground that the relations between them were wilfully
illicit. Yet it is apparent that the court did not regard proof of co-
habitation and reputation as sufficient to raise a presumption that a
prior valid marriage had been contracted. Witness the statement
of the court to the effect that the co-habitation of the parties in Cali-
fornia, a common law state, was insufficient, standing alone, to estab-
lish a common law marriage.'
In In re Wilburs Estate' it appears that Wilbur had married an
Indian girl, according to the custom of her tribe. The law at that
'See Note 2, supra.
'4 Wash. 70), 30 Pac. 1059, 17 L. R. A. 573 (1892).
'9 Wash. 115, 37 Pae. 316 (1894).
1L. R. A. 1915E, 50.
'8 Wash. 35, 35 Pac. 407, 40 Am. St. Rep. 886 (1894) affirmed in 14
Wash. -4, 44 Pac. 26) (1896).
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time prohibited white men from inter-marrying with Indians. That
law was repealed shortly after the marriage and Wilbur thereafter
co-habited with this girl as his wife and continuously and openly
acknowledged the children to be his legitimate sons. No presumption
of marriage was raised in that case from the fact of co-habitation.
In the case of Summerville v. Summerville,' the doctnne announced
but not applied in the McLaughlin case, supra, was again invoked and
again not applied. There, in a suit by the wife for divorce, the hus-
band challenged the sufficiency of the evidence to establish that the
parties had been properly married. She testified that there had been
some form of a ceremony, followed by co-habitation, that a child had
been born which he had admitted to be his, and that he had held her
out as his wife. The actual evidence as to co-habitation and reputa-
tion seems to have consisted of little more than reference to occasional
remarks upon the part of the man which might be construed as
acknowledging her as his wife.'0 He denied that there was a cere-
mony or that there had been more than a contract to marry. His
testimony was impeached, hers was corroborated. There was no evi-
dence of a license having been obtained or a certificate issued. The
court said. "The intendment of the law is to presume from such
testimony that valid marriage existed and when such facts appear in
evidence the burden of proof is cast upon the party denying it to
dearly show the contrary 'If a ceremony of marriage
appears in the evidence, it is presumed to have been rightfully per-
formed and to have been preceded by all needful preliminaries.' ,1"
By way of dictum the court further pointed out that a valid mar-
riage may be presumed to exist from general reputation among the
acquaintances of the parties that such is the fact when that reputation
is accompanied by co-habitation and arises from their holding them-
selves out to the world as occupying that relation to which the law
refers when marriage is mentioned. It is dear from the opinion that
the court based its decision, not on the presumption, but rather upon
the evidence of a ceremony. The decision is the one naturally to be
expected from an application of the presumption rule. It can be
reconciled with the former cases, however, only on the assumption
that the presumption of validity will not apply in cases where the
proof clearly shows that the inception of the marital relation was
illegal. If, however, there is any attempt \to establish a ceremony,
then it seems the presumption will be applied. In either event, the
rule as stated in the dicta was not applied in the solution of the
respective cases.
For the first time we find the presumption rule applied in all its
force in Shank v. Wilson. 2 The property of decedent was distributed
to his widow. She was sued by the plaintiffs who claimed as heirs of
'31 Wash. 411, 7- Pac. 84 (1903).0o L. R. A. 1915E, 50.
"Accord, In re Esnmans" Estate, 117 Wash. 182, 200 Pac. 1117 (1921).
"33 Wash. 612, 74 Pac. 812 (1903).
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decedent and who further claimed that the property in question was
acquired by decedent before his marriage to the defendant and was
therefore separate property The date of the marriage therefore be-
came the decisive point in the controversy The plaintiffs showed
that the marriage ceremony was performed in 1900 and that the
property had been acquired prior thereto. The defendant showed
that she and the decedent had lived together many years priod to 1900
co-habiting and holding themselves out as husband and wife. It was
held that when no common law marriage is allowed, proof of con-
tinued co-habitation and conduct consistent with the marriage relation,
raises a presumption that they were preceded by a legal marriage. Nor
was this presumption combated by proof of the subsequent ceremonial
marriage.13
In Nelson v. Carlson,14 plaintiff sued to quiet title and the question
was whether the decedent acquired a community interest in the prem-
ises as plaintiff's wife. The decedent's son by a former marriage testi-
fied that he was brought from Sweden to the home of his mother and
the plaintiff in Colorado, that he understood that they had married,
that they had co-habited and been regarded as husband and wife and
that the plaintiff had never denied that they were such until he filed
his reply in this suit; that he had in fact erected a monument to the
decedent as Mrs. Nelson. The court held that the presumption of a
valid marriage was not overcome. That the court was influenced
solely by the presumption rule is indicated by its rejection of the
plaintiff's argument that there could not have been a common law
marriage in Washington and that the evidence did not show that such
a marriage had been consummated in Colorado.
In the next case on the point"' the wife testified positively to a
ceremony, but the husband denied there ever was one. It was held
that where the testimony conflicts a ceremonial marriage may be proven
by circumstances such as co-habitation and reputation as husband and
wife. When such circumstances are shown the presumption of mar-
riage exists and the burden is on the party denying the marriage to
show that such ceremony had never been performed. 6 Thus the court
evaded the propositions propounded by counsel based upon the Mc
Laughlin case, supra, to the effect that a common law marriage could
not be held legal and that here no marriage was proven although there
was evidence of co-habitation and repute.
In Weatherall v. Weatherall7 it was said "The uniform and
unbroken current of opinion in this court has been that while a com-
mon law marriage is invalid in this state, yet evidence of co-habitation
and reputation is admissible for the purpose of raising a legal pre-
" As to the effect of subsequent ceremonial marriage, see also Kromer v.
Friday, 10 Wash. 61, 39 Pac. 9-9, 3! L. R. A. 671 (1895). It will be noticed
here that there was no testimony as to how the marital relationship continued.
This, however, may be sufficient to distinguish it from the earlier cases.
1144 Wash. 651, 94 Pac. 477 (1908).
"
5 Potter v. Potter 45 Wash. 401, 89 Pac. 65 (1907).
"
6Accord, Thomas v. Thomas, 53 Wash. -97, 101 Pac. 865 (1909).
" 56 Wash. 344, 105 Pac. 822 (1909).
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sumption of a prior ceremonial marriage. The cogency of the pre-
sumption will, of course, depend upon the facts of each particular case
Their conduct towards each other is equivalent in law
to a continuing declaration by each that they were occupying the
relation of husband and wife."
It seems that almost any testimony as to a ceremony, if uncontra-
dicted, will establish a valid marriage.' s On the other hand, no pre-
sumption of marriage seems to arise where the marriage was void
because of the incapacity of the parties;19 nor where it positively
appears that the parties made no bona fide attempt to change their
relationship after the removal of the disability;2- nor where the parties
lived together as husband and wife after an attempt to perform the
ceremonial marriage which was, in fact, no ceremony at all ;21 nor
where the woman is lewd and free with her favors for in such case
co-habitation is not very strong evidence of marriage, and moreover,
decency, already lost, does not call upon the law for a protective
presumption.22  Where a ceremony has been performed the authority
of the officer and all the prerequisites of a valid marriage will be pre-
sumed until the contrary appeaxs.23  The statutes concerning thee
issuance of licenses and recording of certificates are regulatory merely,
and violations thereof may subject the violators to punishment, but
will not affect the validity of the marriage.
24
In conclusion, then, we find that the substantive law definitely
established that no marriage is valid in this state unless ceremonially
performed. The dicta in the decisions, however, assert the broad
doctrine that evidence of co-habitation and repute will raise the pre-
'Koloff v. Chtcago, Milwaukee 4- Puget Sound Railroad Co., 71 Wash.
543, 129 Pac. 398 (1913), Potts v. Potts, 81 Wash. 27, 142 Pac. 448 (1914)
McDonald v. White, 46 Wash. 334, 89 Pac. 891 (1907).
.Tohnson v. Johnson, 57 Wash. 89, 106 Pac. 500, 26 L. R. A. (N. S.) 179
(1910).
'Blodgett v. Blodgett, 109 Wash. 597, 187 Pac. 340 (19.0) In re Mc-
Laughlin's Estate, supra.
'Meton v. Indudtnzal Ins. Dept., 104 Wash. 65-, 177 Pac. 696 (1919).
In this case the parties, unable to read or speak English, acting through a
supposed interpreter, filed their affidavit and procured a marriage license,
which proceeding they believed to constitute the marriage itself. Cohabitation
and reputation were held as insufficient to raise a presumption of a valid
marriage in this case because as the court said, the evidence overcame any
such presumption; it proved too much. The effect of tins decision would
seem to be that parties making an honest but mistaken attempt to comply
with the law and who set up such attempt at the trial, will be held not
properly married, whereas, under the former cases, parties who have made no
attempt to perform a ceremomal marriage, but who nevertheless produced no
evidence at the trial as to the manner of the inception of the marital relation,
under the presumption rule will be held to be married properly.
' Weatherall v. Weatherall, 63 Wash. 526, 115 Pac. 1078 (1911) Kelley v.
Kitsap County, 5 Wash. 521, 32 Pac. 551 (1893), Goldwater v. Burnside, 2
Wash. 215, 60 Pac. 409 (1900).
'In re Sloan's Estate, 50 Wash. 86, 96 Pac. 684, 17 L. R. A. (N. S.) 960
(1908).
I In re Hollopeter 5- Wash. 41, 100 Pac. 159, 17 Ann Cas. 91, 21 L. RL. A.
(N. S.) 847 (1909) Cushman v. Cushman, 80 Wash. 615, 142 Pac. 26 (1914),
State v. Nelson, 39 Wash. 221, 81 Pac. 7-1 (1905).
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sumption of a prior valid ceremonial marriage. With the possible
exception, however, of the case of Shank v. Wilson, supra, that doc-
trine has not been applied without certain qualifications. For instance,
the doctrine was not applied where the evidence showed positively that
there had been no prior valid marriage, nor was the doctrine applied
in the earlier cases where the testimony was silent as to the manner
of the commencement of the relation. It will be noted, however, that
the later cases seem to hold that where such proof is silent the presump-
tion will arise. Where there is evidence of a ceremonial wedding,
the presumption of the validity of the ceremony will be indulged even
though such evidence be contradicted.
Perhaps the only safe deduction that can be drawn from the
decisions is that the presumption favors the legality of a marriage
only when the case is tried on the theory that there had been a valid
marriage, although the dicta in the cases would indicate that the court
would find in favor of the validity of the marriage on proof of co-
habitation and reputation alone.
Burton J. Wheelon.
RECENT CASES
CnATirEs-LxAIrITY FOR SERVANT'S NEGLIGExcE.-T, for pay, became a
patient at defendant's hospital, operated as a charitable institution. A student
nurse negligently failed to remove an aluminum hot water bottle from the
bed wherein the patient was placed after the operation. T sued the defendant
corporation for injuries sustained, alleging negligence by the nurse in her care
of him and negligence by the defendant in the selection and retention of the
nurse assigned to take care of him. Held. T could recover only on the latter
ground. Tribble v. Mdssionary Sisters of the Sacred Heart, 37 Wash. Dec.
285, 242 Pac. 37- (1926).
The tort liability of a charitable corporation for the negligence of its
servants and agents is a perplexing question. Some courts insist that the
liability for a pay patient, at least, should be that of an ordinary private
corporation either because of the public interest in the careful performance of
the duties assumed by the corporation or because exemption from liability is
a legislative and not a judicial matter. Glavin v. Rhode Island Hospital, 12
R. I. 411 (1879), though by statute now contra; Tucker v. Mobile Infrmary
Association, 191 Ala. 57., 68 So. 4, L. R. A. 1915D 1167 (1915), City of Shaw-
nee v. Roush, 101 Okla. 60, 223 Pac. 354, (1923).
Other courts go to the other extreme and exempt charitable corporations
from all liability to beneficiaries even for negligence in selecting servants or
agents. Roosen v. Peter Bent Brigham Hospital, 2035 Mass. 66, 126 N. E. 392,
14 A. L. R. 563, Adams v. University Hospital, 122 Mo. App. 675, 99 S. W
453 (1907) Hamburger v. Cornell University, 204 App. Div. 664, 199 N. Y. S.
369 (1923), (fee-paying student). Ordinarily, if due care has been used in
selecting servants, no liability for the torts of the servant is recognized. See
cases rnfra.
This exemption from liability does not ordinarily extend to strangers or
employes injured, and they may recover. Hordyn v. Salvation Army, 199 N. Y.
